![]() Decisions made since 2011 and the efforts made, in particular by the United Nations, have not achieved the hoped-for results. It is a characteristic that determines the process. It is the result of a war for democracy with multiple economic issues at stake, conducted by NATO countries that imposed the transition. The Libyan transition sparked in 2011 is therefore a very particular case when compared to transition models analysed in literature. Air raids had decimated the Libyan armed forces, creating a void quickly filled by armed militias of different persuasions, especially in Tripoli and in the west of the country. The war conducted by certain Western countries and NATO and in which France and Great Britain played the greatest roles, destroyed the embryonic Libyan state, thereby creating the conditions for Islamic State-Daesh to establish itself. The overthrowing of Gheddafi’s regime by force in March 2011 plunged the country into anarchy and transformed it into a hub for trafficking human beings with Europe as their destination. Whatever one’s opinion may be regards to the nature, causes and reasons for these events, they traumatised Libya and revealed the existence of centrifugal forces that have accelerated the country’s disorganisation making the establishment of stability and the democratic transition less easy. Indisputably, the events that took place between February and October 2011 profoundly affected Libyan society. The particularities of the Libyan transition.Should this crisis persist, the international community will have to review the entirety of the political process in a country experiencing serious instability. It is therefore urgent to bring together the political players who matter in the country and amend the 2015 Agreement so that it becomes a useful tool, allowing a resolution of the crisis and ensuring the best possible conditions for a democratic transition. Even more serious is the fact that the planned institutional mechanisms, which should also guarantee better transition conditions, are incoherent, ineffective and contain multiple contradictions that make efficient governance impossible during the transition period. ![]() In his opinion, “dialogue in its current form has lost its usefulness and must be rekindled with players having real importance in society.” Effectively, the Agreement discussed here was signed by Libyans with very little political influence, which is also one of the reasons for its fragility. Mahmoud Jibril, one of the historical leaders of the 2011 uprising and first president of the National Transition Council, recently said that he has never considered the Libyan Political Agreement as the solution to this crisis. Nevertheless, the 2015 Political Agreement, the result of lengthy and gruelling discussions, cannot lead to a resolution of this crisis. Effectively, it is crucial that Libyans should negotiate with one another. The principle of establishing a dialogue between the parties in conflict is not in question. ![]() On the contrary, it simply exacerbates matters and makes it unpredictable and uncertain. The paper will also show that the Political Agreement addressed, in principle utopic and generous, will not result in the resolution of the crisis, nor can it guarantee conditions for the transition’s success. The objective is to show that this crisis is a profound one and caused by circumstances Libya has experienced since the beginning of this transition in 2011. This paper addresses the political crisis in Libya and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement also known as the Skhirat agreement (Morocco). Integrating Diversities, Traditions and Citizenship. ![]() Below the essay of Moncef Djaziri, University of Lausanne, that is part of our monography State-Building in Libya. ![]()
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